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ABSTRACT

This report on the effects of court-ordered desegregation in the Dallas (Texas) Independent School District is divided into three major sections. The first updates national desegregation literature. The second section outlines briefly the history of desegregation in Dallas schools over the past ten years, and discusses the court's intervention in the 1976 plan in relation to school enrollment patterns, student assignment and ethnic distribution. The effects of desegregation on student achievement are examined in the third section. Median percentile rankings and gains for white, black and Hispanic students are reported by grade, subject and sub-district. (JCD)

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DESEGREGATION: THE DALLAS EXPERIENCE

OS81-830

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Approved report of the
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Dallas, Texas
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DESEGREGATION: THE DALLAS EXPERIENCE

William J. Webster and Russell A. Chadbourn
Dallas Independent School District

As of this date, September 1981, the Dallas Independent School District once again finds itself in federal court relative to desegregation issues. This paper attempts to put recent history into perspective and to examine the effects of five years of the 1976 District Court Order to desegregate Dallas public schools. It is divided into three major sections. The first updates the national literature relative to desegregation. The second outlines briefly the history of desegregation in the District over the past ten years and correlates court intervention with population trends. The third examines the effects of the 1976 court order on the most important variable of all, student achievement. Finally, a summary is presented that capsules the data from the three major sections of the paper.

The Desegregation Literature

In 1973, Webster and Mendro (1973) conducted a thorough review of the desegregation literature. In order to facilitate an examination of relevant research, the authors presented a review of methodological techniques appropriate for examining the effects of desegregation. This review included necessary design prerequisites, statistical analysis techniques, reporting standards, and minimum requirements and precautions when recommended design factors could not be employed. Studies of fifteen induced desegregation programs were examined, using the standards specified in the methodological review. The analysis clearly demonstrated that, in general, the existing literature suffered from many faults, both in terms of experimental design

and in terms of reporting standards. Particular problems included (a) inadequate descriptions of treatments, subjects, classroom procedures, desegregation procedures, and curriculum implementation; (b) inadequate data on the comparability of treatment groups; (c) incomplete reporting of necessary statistical data; and (d) a nearly total lack of process evaluation.

Also included in the study (Webster and Mendro, 1973) was an examination of the relationship between enrollment patterns and desegregation orders in large city school systems. These data demonstrated a marked correlation between such orders and white enrollment loss. Although correlation does not necessarily imply causation, the relationship between desegregation orders and abrupt declines in white enrollment was too conspicuous to be attributed to chance. The relationship was particularly strong at the elementary level. Thus, two major generalizations emerged from the data analyzed in the Webster-Mendro paper:

1. There did not exist any reliable evidence pertaining to the success or failure of induced desegregation in general, and busing in particular, and its effects upon student achievement and associated variables. The only statement that existing data appeared to warrant was that the achievement of neither majority nor minority students seemed to be adversely affected by induced desegregation. No conclusive evidence concerning possible positive effects of induced desegregation on minority achievement was presented in the studies reviewed.

2. If the major purpose of desegregating the public schools was to promote societal integration, then current methods were failing in the large cities. The cities and their public school systems were being resegregated at an alarming rate.

A further examination of the desegregation literature as of 1979 yielded little evidence to alter the aforementioned conclusions. If one thoroughly examines the literature, a study can be found to support almost any point of view. A classic example of this phenomenon is illustrated by the Armor-

Pettigrew debates which drew diametrically opposed conclusions on the basis of many of the same studies (Armor, 1972; Pettigrew, et al., 1973). James Coleman, a noted sociologist, performed a complete reversal on the desegregation issue (Coleman 1966, 1976). Middleton (1978) also cited the Coleman-Levin disagreement over the interpretation of a large number of studies on the effects of desegregation.

An examination of studies on the effects of desegregation yielded claims which ranged from the existence of positive benefits of desegregation for both blacks and whites through the position of positive benefits to one race and negative benefits to the other race, to the findings of negative benefits to both. Compounding these choices were the results which showed no benefits to either. Additionally, the benefits examined may be academic (usually standardized test scores), psychological (typically self-concept scores), or social (measures of interrace interaction and attitudes).

A sample of studies offering the various viewpoints will be presented to give the reader an idea of the degree of diversity of results presented in the literature. Clark (1955) made the unsubstantiated claim that school integration alone would raise black childrens' self-concept and academic performance to match whites. Crain and Mahard (1978) claimed poorly-done studies were more likely to show low or negative achievement gains for blacks, and that 80% of the mandatory desegregation studies they examined showed positive black gain while only 55% of studies on voluntary desegregation showed positive black gain. Connery (1971), Sacramento School District (1971), Evans (1973), Ornstein (1975), Pascarella (1979), Commission on Civil Rights (1977a, 1977b), and Berry (1976), reported positive achievement gains by blacks in desegregated situations. Felice and Richardson (1977) indicated majority dropout rates were not affected by desegregation and minority dropout rates were improved in

those high socioeconomic schools where teachers had favorable expectations. In an earlier study, Felice (1973) had concluded that Mexican-American dropout rate decreased under desegregation, but white dropout rate increased. Hawley (1979) topped it off by criticizing research on desegregation as limited, unrepresentative, and uncritical, with unreasonable standards for judging its success.

Among the studies positing negative benefits are those by Leech (1973) and Miller (1979). These studies suggested that busing produced no educational gains, hindered the psychological development of black children, and intensified racial misunderstanding. Miller cited research by Felice (1974) in supporting the latter claim. Jenks and Brown (1975) found test performance of blacks declined in a classroom with a high percentage of whites. Maruyama and Miller (1979) reanlyzed a study by Levin and St. John which supported the theory of lateral transmission of values (Coleman, et al., 1966) that achievement-oriented norms and values of the middle-class white child would be transmitted to the lower-class/minority child through contact and found that the evidence did not support the theory and that achievement apparently led to acceptance rather than vice-versa. Kurtz (1975), Armor (1972), Leech (1973), Prewitt (1971), and Arnez (1978) cited results indicating deleterious effects of busing upon black children.

To further confuse the issue, both opponents and proponents of desegregation claimed that a showing of no benefits was support for their position. Opponents felt that if there were no clear educational gains, the community upset, great expense, discipline problems, interracial conflict, and time and energy spent on busing were sufficient grounds to justify calling a halt to busing for desegregation purposes. Proponents felt that even if there

were no clear educational gains, the increased interracial contact would lead to better understanding, minority children would not be ostracized by segregated classrooms, and all of the children involved would experience life in a multicultural environment.

Studies indicating mixed or no benefit included a recommendation by Glazer (1972) that all research showing benefits of busing for black children be reevaluated. Christison and Sida (1976) found that, with busing, Georgia school superintendents felt blacks gained and whites lost, racial tension and discipline problems increased, and black's attendance improved. Armor (1972) felt proponents should prove benefits would occur with no side effect. Dawson (1973) found very little change in the achievement gap between white and black students after seven years of desegregation. Pascal (1977) concluded that consequences of specific actions used to desegregate schools are unknown and suggested additional research. Armor (1977) stated that school desegregation had such ideological momentum that objective and rational assessment of its true effects seemed unattainable. Crain (1973), Shellberg and Halteman (1976), Cohen (1974), Commission on Civil Rights (1977c) and Laurent (1970) cited studies showing desegregation had little or no effect on achievement scores of black students. Middleton and Crosby (1979) found positive effects of desegregation on achievement but negative effects on other aspects of school life for black students. Eubanks and Levine (1975) claimed there was no existing proper study that showed busing improved black achievement. Cusek and Ayling (1973) found informal racial interaction negligible, while attempts to reduce potential race conflict consumed enormous amounts of organizational energy. Schmandt, et al., (1978) stated that the massive busing in Louisville and Nashville was not necessarily associated with

educational benefits but did keep the black proportion below the "tipping point". Sampson, et al., (1978) stated that since desegregation efforts were failing to make an educational difference, alternatives to the "cultural deficit" orientation such as "freedom of choice" should be considered. Finally, Simmons (1978) contended that black children from broken homes had lower self-esteem in desegregated schools and that black children in segregated schools received higher marks but did not score as well on national tests as did their desegregated peers.

Another aspect of the desegregation process which has produced much controversy is that of "white flight". Coleman (1966, 1976) described the concept of "white flight" as being a consequence of desegregation activities, i.e., knowledge of planned or ongoing desegregation activities would result in large numbers of white families moving to the suburbs or enrolling their children in private schools. Farley (1976) and Rossell (1978b) felt that desegregation activities were not the main causal factor of "white flight".

The data relating to "white flight" are subject to various interpretations. Those studies supporting the belief that "white flight" is a result of desegregation activities include Coleman, who claimed that busing policy had failed and that integration was impossible until middle-class whites and blacks come back to the inner city (Ford, 1975). Armor and Schwarzbach (1978) felt white loss was such that the amount of desegregation was declining and that court-ordered desegregation, coupled with normal demographic trends, was producing ethnic isolation in many large school districts. Cunningham, et al., (1978) cited evidence showing increased private school enrollment but little white exodus with the advent of desegregation.

Levine and Meyer (1977) indicated white enrollment decline accelerated in schools with high proportions of, or recent rapid increases in, black students. Ravitch (1978) stated that, although it was impossible to measure the impact of school desegregation on "white flight", it was equally insupportable to claim there was no effect whatever. Kurtz (1975) suggested that desegregation in Pasadena and Inglewood caused substantial losses of white enrollment. Noblit and Collins (1978) reported that Memphis lost over half of its white student enrollment in five years at a rate far exceeding that predicted by demographic factors. They also stated that "white flight" could be attributed to many factors, while school flight could be directly attributed to forced desegregation, the school system's response to it, and racial attitudes of the whites. Rossell (1978c) saw "white flight" as a minor problem, but conceded that gradual phase-in of desegregation plans caused more "white flight"; whites sent to black schools had twice as much flight as vice-versa, and inflammatory media representation increased "white flight". Finally, Branscombe (1977) stated that, in Denver, one effect of school desegregation had been a movement of whites to the suburbs or to private schools.

Studies which deny the importance of the "white flight" thesis include one by Farley (1976b) who cited falling birth rate and population shifts as the major causes of white enrollment decline. Orfield (1976) claimed much of "white flight" was just "flight" since "black flight" had taken place in Washington, D.C. Rossell (1978b, 1978c) tended to downplay the existence of "white flight" and suggested that two long-term demographic trends, suburbanization and declining birth rate, be isolated. She also (1979) suggested that "white flight", if it exists, would be more prevalent among parents of

elementary school age children who were more concerned with safety for their child. In addition, her study (1978a) of 113 school districts suggested that school desegregation had a disintegrative effect during implementation and an integrative effect in post-implementation years. Sly and Pol (1976) credited birth rate differential between black and white as the major component of "white flight". They contended that school desegregation was not making whites flee the city any faster than they had in the past. Dentler (1978) showed that, of the 15,000 "lost" white students in Boston over a five-year period, only about 5,000 withdrew for desegregation-related reasons, while the other 10,000 were lost due to birth rate decline and out-of-state job mobility. Cunningham, Hask, and Johnson (1978) contended that "white flight" was caused by a combination of low white birth rates, federal suburban housing subsidies, and urban crime, as well as rioting and ethnic polarization of political power structures.

Taeuber (1978) pointed out that social science (experts) for contending litigants often presented contradictory evidence. The resultant ambiguity allowed judges and administrators to dismiss the utility of social science data and rely on their own intuition of the social process. He suggested that many of the empirical ambiguities concerning the causes and magnitude of "white flight" stemmed from the narrow policy focus of most recent research. By failing to place the process of "white flight" in a general theory of urban demographic change, researchers became susceptible to conclusions that encouraged a simplistic misidentification of a complex set of behaviors.

Cohen and Weiss (1977) illustrated the foregoing point at an earlier time by stating that most litigants would be able to find some scientific support for their views. This suggests that social science is an adversarial

instrument; as different social enthusiasms come into fashion, research and policy embrace and express them. Research contributes something to these changing climates of opinion but also responds to broader shifts in social belief and expression. They also pointed out that research methodology had become more sophisticated, with a broader variety of analytic skills. New distinctions had evolved and projects had multiplied, as had competing ways to define problems and interpret results. The Pettigrew & Green (1976) vs. Coleman (1976), and Coleman (1976) vs. Farley (1976a) disagreements illustrated the difficulties of interpretation.

Improvement of social science research leads to greater complexity and more divergence in possible views of the problem and the solution. Simplistic views fade away to a richer, more diverse vision of the problem and its possible remedies. Additionally, Young and Bress (1975) pointed out that as Americans in the 1970's become more aware of the complexities and uncertainties surrounding social intervention, they may develop, as have ecologists, more respect for the interrelatedness of many unseen forces and more awareness of the likelihood that each well-intentioned intervention may have large and unanticipated consequences.

The proliferation of printed media has been a mixed blessing. Although more information is produced, being able to locate it is often a problem because of the inaccessibility of some of the sources (convention papers, organization papers). Both editorial changes and control over what is printed in professional journals could lead to promulgation of one aspect of a problem. Pettigrew and Green (1976), examining another aspect of the problem, criticized the manner in which press and media reported (and failed to report) a complicated and confusing academic debate.

As any survey researcher knows, one can influence the response to a question by the way in which the question is worded. Thus, instruments developed by one researcher may not be acceptable to all researchers. Weinberg (1975, 1977) suggested that the most difficult problem in self-concept studies was the lack of a universally-recognized measure of self-concept and aspirations. Researchers need to sharpen the focus of studies, use meaningful and acceptable instruments, and investigate more than a superficial aspect of the problem.

In the face of conflicting evidence from well designed and implemented studies, it seems appropriate to consider treating each as a separate case. Perhaps the interrelatedness of the relevant variables involved is too complex to make a generalization to a wide population of settings, yet an appropriate generalization can often be made to the specific environment of the study. Thus, it is relevant to dismiss the national literature on desegregation and focus on specific instances of the implementation of desegregation policy. It is with this point in mind that we move to a case study of the Dallas experience.

The Dallas Experience

The Dallas Independent School District (DISD) has been in court involving issues related to school desegregation since 1955. In September, 1965, single attendance zones were established for all elementary schools and black twelfth-graders were permitted to enroll in previously all-white senior high schools. Faculties were integrated in 1966 and dual attendance zones were eliminated for junior and senior high schools in 1966 and 1967, respectively. Thus, by September, 1967, the abolishment of dual attendance zones eliminated de jure segregation in the DISD. This had been accomplished with no observable effect on the white or minority student populations of the schools.

Table 1

Number and Percentage of District Students by Year and by Ethnicity[1]

Year	Total District Enrollment	No. of White and Other Students[2]	% of White and Other Students	No. of White Students	% of White Students	No. of Mex-Am Students	% of Mex-Am Students	No. of Black Students	% of Black Students
1955-56	95,538	79,364	83					16,174	17
1956-57	100,765	83,080	82					17,685	18
1957-58	106,704	87,542	82					19,162	18
1958-59	110,002	89,514	81					20,488	19
1959-60	119,223	96,851	81					22,372	19
1960-61	124,207	99,890	80					24,317	20
1961-62	128,563	102,185	79					26,378	21
1962-63	133,519	105,234	79					28,285	21
1963-64	137,838	106,135	77					31,703	23
1964-65	143,395	108,369	76					35,026	24
1965-66[3]	146,510								
1966-67[3]	150,241								
1967-68[3]	154,327								
1968-69[4]	156,863			96,900	62	12,176	8	47,105	30
1969-70	162,901			96,299	59	13,555	8	52,374	32
1970-71	164,787			94,544	57	13,937	8	55,530	34
1971-72	158,996			85,631	54	15,028	9	57,455	36
1972-73	154,589			78,075	51	15,892	10	59,805	39
1973-74	152,837			72,640	48	17,093	11	62,237	41
1974-75	149,080			66,348	45	18,418	12	63,510	43
1975-76	144,235			59,502	41	18,982	13	64,565	45
1976-77	139,036			54,182	39	19,471	14	64,325	46
1977-78	136,288			49,081	36	20,573	15	65,541	48
1978-79	133,577			45,139	34	21,811	16	65,311	49
1979-80	131,047			42,087	32	22,719	17	64,726	49
1980-81	128,919			39,060	30	24,681	19	63,420	49

[1] The information used to construct this table was taken from the Superintendent's general reports, and System-Wide Evaluation tape SUBTRENDDATA.

[2] Prior to the 1968-69 school year all nonblack students were classified as white.

[3] Ethnic breakdowns are not available for these years.

[4] Data for this and all later years was taken from System-Wide Evaluation enrollment tape SUBTRENDDATA.



Figure 1 DISD ENROLLMENT TRENDS 1968-1980

Table 1 displays the student enrollment data by ethnicity between 1955-56 and 1980-81 (Berry, 1981).

On October 6, 1970, the attack on de facto segregation began. Twenty-one black and Mexican-American students filed a new suit against the DISD. The suit contended that segregation had been perpetuated "through choice of building sites, staffing of administrative offices and teaching positions, and through the use of a neighborhood assignment plan." United States District Judge William M. Taylor was asked to enjoin the construction of new schools and the purchasing of school sites which did not promote desegregation and to develop a "comprehensive plan" for desegregating the school system (Golz, 1970).

Without going into a great deal of detail, it is important to note that Judge Taylor handed down a desegregation order involving the busing of approximately 7,300 students at the secondary level on August 2, 1971. This order had many other provisions, but was appealed by the plaintiffs less than three hours after it was rendered and portions of it were put on hold. The United States Fifth Circuit Court received the appeal and was not to rule until July 23, 1975. Thus, the case was before the Fifth Circuit Court for almost four years. Those four years of uncertainty were significantly related to a drop in DISD enrollment of 26,129 white students (30.5%). Figure 1 displays those data.

Finally, the appeals court ruled (July 23, 1975) that the 1971 desegregation order was inadequate and Judge Taylor was asked to draw up a new plan to be implemented by midterm of the 1975-76 school year. A series of legal motions by the plaintiffs and the defendants had little effect on the situation. On September 10, 1975, the NAACP and the Dallas School Board filed

desegregation plans in Judge Taylor's court. The NAACP plan was designed to bring the ethnic composition of every school in the District to within 10% of the District ethnic composition. Schools having the District's ethnic composition were left with present assignment patterns, while the remaining schools were paired and clustered to achieve the District's ethnic composition. Other details of the plan were "satellite" attendance zones for 14 of the high schools and for 20 of the junior high schools, extensive busing of over 40,000 white and minority students, one magnet senior high school, two magnet junior high schools, and a multiethnic cultural center for elementary students.

The Dallas School Board's plan divided the District into three categories for student assignment purposes: (a) naturally integrated areas, (b) predominantly white areas, and (c) predominantly minority areas. The plan did not affect 52 schools in the naturally integrated areas, and it did not affect 46 schools in predominantly minority South and West Dallas. The pairing and clustering of contiguous and noncontiguous schools were proposed to desegregate 73 schools in predominantly white areas of the city. Busing was confined primarily to grades 4 through 7 and affected approximately 18,000 students, 6,000 of whom were white, 10,000 black, and 2,000 Mexican-American.

Standardized grade levels were also proposed. Elementary schools would contain grades K-3; intermediate schools, grades 4-5; middle schools, grades 6-7; junior high schools, grades 8-9; and senior high schools, grades 10-12.

Seventeen magnet schools would be formed to serve all of the students in the District. Ten of the proposed magnets would be for elementary students,

and seven would serve junior and senior high school students. The elementary magnets would stress fundamentals and individualization, while the secondary magnets would offer a variety of career education programs. The school board plan also proposed a continuation of the majority-to-minority transfer program established under the 1971 court order.

On September 16, 1975, Judge Taylor rejected both the NAACP and school board plans. On the same day, Judge Taylor denied requests of seven suburban school districts that the complaints filed against them be dismissed. He stated that he would first hear evidence for their inclusion and then make a decision as to whether they should be part of the new desegregation plan.

On September 27, Dr. Josiah C. Hall, a retired superintendent from Dade County, Florida, public schools, was appointed by Judge Taylor as a consultant to help draft a desegregation plan.

In his October 16, 1975, progress report to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Taylor stated that, unless told otherwise, he would not require the implementation of a new desegregation plan until the beginning of the 1976-77 school year, (Cappleman, 1975, p. 1A). As reasons for the delay, Judge Taylor cited the shortage of time and the fact that all Texas schools were on the quarter system.

Before hearings on specific desegregation plans could actually begin, arguments on the consolidation of the DISD and the seven suburban school districts had to be decided. The problem was eased somewhat by the plaintiffs voluntarily seeking to drop Wilmer-Hutchins from the suit (October 17) and, subsequently, Lancaster, DeSoto, Duncanville, Irving, and Carrollton-Farmers Branch (October 28). In both instances, Judge Taylor granted motions to dismiss the complaints against these school districts (October 23 and October 30, respectively).

Hearings on the inclusion of Highland Park were held from December 3 to December 11. Plaintiffs argued that the governments of the Park Cities acted to exclude blacks from living in the Park Cities and from attending Highland Park Schools (Seibel, 1975a, p. 1A). However, Judge Taylor felt that the plaintiffs' evidence was not pertinent, and Highland Park's actions in no way caused the segregation in Dallas. Thus, the complaint against Highland Park was also dismissed.

While the issue of including suburbs was being decided, the plaintiffs asked the appeals court (on October 22) to require Judge Taylor to implement a new desegregation plan during the 1975-76 school year or, if not a new plan, to permit an interim order which would alleviate overcrowded conditions at some schools. Also during this period, the United States Supreme Court refused to review the Dallas case (on November 3), and the Oak Cliff-Pleasant Grove intervenors asked for an interim order (on November 5) halting the busing of blacks into four majority black schools by March 1, 1976 ("Chronology Lists Events," 1976, p. 4A).

On December 18, Judge Taylor asked all of the city leaders in Dallas to get involved in the formulation of a desegregation plan that would make Dallas "a leader in the field of education" (Eyre & Miller, 1975, p. 1D). Quite significantly, Judge Taylor also stated that he was considering making the Dallas Alliance's task force a friend of the court.

The Dallas Alliance was created in 1974 by a group of young businessmen and community leaders as a new mechanism to focus attention on the problems in the city and develop responses to them ("The Dallas Plan," 1976, p. 1A). Its task force was a special 21-member triethnic group given the responsibility of coming up with a desegregation plan for Judge Taylor to consider.

The group had the support of the Dallas Chamber of Commerce and the Citizens Council and was the embodiment of community involvement, an aspect Judge Taylor considered essential for the successful implementation of a desegregation plan.

Dr. Josiah C. Hall's desegregation plan was filed in Judge Taylor's court on December 29. This plan proposed dividing the District into the following categories for student assignment purposes: (a) naturally integrated areas, (b) paired and clustered areas, and (c) predominantly minority areas. Schools in naturally integrated areas would retain present student assignment patterns. Predominantly white schools would be paired and clustered with schools in predominantly minority areas.

The end results of this plan were 75 desegregated schools. Fifty-six schools in naturally integrated areas retained present assignment patterns, as did 42 schools in predominantly minority areas. Dr. Hall explained that desegregating this last group of schools would alter assignments to naturally integrated schools.

This plan proposed restructuring the school system along five basic levels: K-1, 2-5, 6-7, 8-9, and 10-12. The kindergarten and first-grade students would attend neighborhood schools. The students in the second through fifth grades would attend schools in mainly white sections of the city. The intermediate school students (sixth and seventh graders) and junior high school students (eighth and ninth graders) would attend schools located in minority sections of the city.

The plan proposed busing over 23,000 students, two-thirds of whom were black. While white and black students essentially shared the burden of busing in the elementary grades, 90% of the 7,900 secondary students who were to be

bused were black (Hamill, 1975, p. 1A). Hall felt that this was an unavoidable compromise between the two guidelines he had attempted to follow: (a) sharing the busing burden between minority and white students, and (b) minimizing travel time.

Dr. Hall also recommended expansion of career education programs, establishment of city-wide centers for performing arts and continuing education, and formation of early childhood centers for four-to-six year-old children.

On January 6, 1976, the plaintiffs appealed the Highland Park decision. Six days later, they filed two desegregation plans. The more extreme plan divided the DISD into seven elementary subdistricts. Each school within a subdistrict was made to reflect the subdistrict's ethnic composition. While 13 naturally integrated schools were unaffected, all of the remaining schools were paired or clustered to achieve the desired ethnic composition. The pairing or clustering affected all grade levels except kindergarten.

The plan also proposed uniform grade configurations throughout the District (K, 1-3, 4-6, 7-9, 10-12), and it called for busing approximately 69,000 students.

Other specifics of the plan were inner-city magnet schools, the continuation of the majority-to-minority transfer program, an expansion of faculty inservice training programs, and a system of accountability to ensure DISD compliance with the plan.

The less extreme plan divided the DISD into eight elementary subdistricts. Thirty-nine schools in naturally integrated areas retained their present student assignment patterns. Schools in seven of the eight subdistricts were paired and clustered to achieve ethnic balance within each school. However, the 15 or 16 schools in the Oak Cliff Subdistrict were left all-black. To attract

white students to the schools in this subdistrict, a "magnet cluster" with superior facilities and a wide range of educational offerings was proposed (Seibel, 1976c, p. 6A).

This plar also proposed magnets in previously minority schools, an expansion of the bilingual program, and, like the previous plan, a continuation of the majority-to-minority transfer program, expanded faculty in-service training programs, and a system of accountability. Overall, more than 45,000 students were to be bused under this plan.

On February 2, 1976, hearings on the desegregation plans began in Judge Taylor's court.

On February 17, the Dallas Alliance Task Force filed its desegregation plan. Unlike the previous plans, this plan was less concerned with actual student assignments and more concerned with establishing criteria for making the assignments. Specifically, the plan suggested that the DISD be divided into five pie-shaped attendance areas or subdistricts of approximately 30,000 students each. One of the attendance areas (East Oak Cliff) would remain predominantly black. The ethnic composition of the four other attendance areas would reflect the ethnic makeup of the entire District within plus or minus five percent.

On March 3, 1976, the Alliance modified its plan by altering high school attendance zones to achieve more desegregation ("Chronology Lists Events," 1976, p. 4A). Two days later, the desegregation hearings closed, and five days later (on March 10), Judge Taylor ordered the DISD to implement the desegregation plan drawn up by the Alliance Task Force. In his ruling, Judge Taylor gave the DISD until March 24 to construct specific student assignments.

Following Alliance concepts, the DISD developed a student assignment plan calling for busing for desegregation purposes in three of six proposed attendance areas or subdistricts. A total of 15,900 students were to be affected, 4,100 of whom were white, 9,500 of whom were black, and 2,300 of whom were Mexican-American.

However, Alliance Task Force members rejected this proposal because only about 25% of the students to be bused were white. The DISD then proceeded to add 2,400 more white students to the final assignment proposal which was filed with Judge Taylor.

On March 25, 1976, the Dallas School Board voted to ask Judge Taylor to delete all references to educational programs and staffing policies from his final desegregation order. Of specific concern to board members were the establishment of an early childhood education program and the setting of ethnic quotas for top-salaried administrators.

On March 29, a group of East Dallas intervenors requested that the DISD assignment plan be modified. Two days later the Alliance Task Force also proposed slight modifications. Finally, on April 7, 1976, Judge Taylor issued the Dallas School Desegregation Order after making minor changes in the District's assignment plan. The following were the essential points of Judge Taylor's ruling.

1. The school District would be divided into six subdistricts, four of which (Northeast, Northwest, Southeast, and Southwest) had to reflect the overall District ethnic composition, plus or minus 5%. The remaining two subdistricts (Seagoville and East Oak Cliff) would be exempt from the ethnic composition requirement.

2. Grade levels would be standardized throughout the District. Elementary schools would contain grades K-3, intermediate schools grades 4-6, middle schools grades 7-8, and high schools grades 9-12.

3. Students in grades K-3 would be assigned according to previous criteria (i.e., to neighborhood schools) with the additional stipulation of assignment to the nearest school if no school existed within a two-mile radius.

4. Over 17,000 students in grades 4-8 who were not already in integrated schools would be bused to integrated intermediate and middle schools centrally located in their subdistrict. A school would be classified as integrated if its minority ratio were within plus or minus 10% of the subdistrict's minority ratio.

5. Students in grades 9-12 would be assigned to the high school in their regular attendance zones.

6. The District would create special 4-6 vanguard schools and 7-8 academies as needs for them were identified. First priority for their establishment would be the East Oak Cliff Subdistrict. In addition, four new magnet high schools would be formed in 1976, and at least three more would be formed by 1979. Voluntary enrollment in these special schools would be encouraged, and guidelines would be established to ensure that enrollments reflected District ethnic proportions.

7. Special attention would be focused on establishing diagnostic-prescriptive elementary (K-3) instructional programs. Other goals at this level would be a reduction in the adult-pupil ratio, maximizing parental involvement, and continuing staff development programs.

8. In the area of special programs, the Bilingual Program would be expanded to grades K-6. English as a Second Language would be expanded to serve grades 9-12. A Multicultural Social Studies Education Program would be provided for all grades. Special education and career education programs would be continued.

9. Participation in the majority-to-minority transfer program would be encouraged.

10. Mexican-Americans would be allowed to participate in a minority-to-majority transfer program. That is, if they comprise less than 5% of the school to which they were originally assigned, they could transfer to a school that offers a Bilingual Program.

11. Students who were physically handicapped, mentally retarded, highly gifted, and those who wanted career education courses or other special courses would be permitted to attend those schools with the appropriate programs. In other words, these students could obtain curriculum transfers.

12. All students who were reassigned to a new attendance zone, or who chose to attend a special school or program which was created by the court order, would receive free transportation.

13. A clear policy on student discipline that included a provision for due process procedures would be developed by the DISD in concert with teachers, principals, and parents.

14. The DISD would continue to improve school facilities in accordance with a plan which the school board had developed in consultation with the Task Force for Educational Excellence. In addition, steps would be taken to construct a new magnet comprehensive Lincoln High School in South Dallas and a new K-3 facility and community center in West Dallas. The DISD would have as a priority the development of a "central core" of high schools.

15. The DISD would adjust employment practices so that (a) by 1979-80 the percentages of black and Mexican-American teachers, principals, and other certified professional personnel would approximate the percentages of 31% black and 8% Mexican-American, and (b) by 1979-80 the percentages of white, black, and Mexican-American top-salaried administrators would approximate within 5% the percentages of 44% white, 44% black, and 12% Mexican-American.

16. The Department of Research, Evaluation, and Information Systems would file an internal audit report with the court on December 15 and April 15 each school year through 1978-79. An external auditor would be appointed and instructed by the court as to the parameters of its report which was to be filed on June 1 each school year through 1978-79.

17. The Tri-Ethnic Committee would continue to receive community input regarding the District's desegregation efforts. Members would be appointed by the court for staggered two-year terms beginning on July 1, 1976.

18. The DISD would focus much of its interest, funding, and activity in predominantly black East Oak Cliff.

19. The DISD would involve all aspects of the Dallas community in implementing the desegregation order.

Hours after Judge Taylor's order was issued, the Oak Cliff and South Dallas branches of the NAACP stated that they would appeal the ruling. Maintenance of all-black schools in East Oak Cliff was given as the reason for the appeal.

On April 14, 1976, the Dallas School Board voted not to appeal. However, it also resolved to reconsider if other appeals were filed.

The two NAACP branches formally filed notice of appeal on April 20, 1976. Reacting to this, the school board voted to cross-appeal, and the Dallas Alliance initiated efforts to defend its plan.

On April 22, six of the 21 plaintiffs in the original desegregation suit filed notice of appeal apparently without the knowledge of their attorneys (Seibel, 1976d, p. 1A). In addition, a third branch of the Dallas NAACP also filed notice of appeal.

The very next day (April 23) a group of North Dallas intervenors who had presented testimony on "white flight" also filed a cross-appeal (Miller, 1976, p. 1A).

On April 26, the plaintiffs' attorneys filed notice of cross-appeal on behalf of two of the original plaintiffs in the five-year-old lawsuit (Seibel, 1967a, p. 1A).

On April 27, the NAACP asked Judge Taylor to stay the assignment of students under the latest plan until the appeal was decided. The reason given for the request was the cost of implementing the order, which the NAACP said the DISD would use as an excuse to impede any future desegregation order.

On May 7, Judge Taylor denied the NAACP's stay request. Judge Taylor felt that a stay would not have been in the "public interest", and he felt that the NAACP had not shown that it would be harmed by the implementation of the order (Seibel, 1976b, p. 1A).

The NAACP responded by renewing its request for a stay with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Again, it was argued that allowing the DISD to spend money implementing the order would be harmful to black students who

would become locked into the all-black schools in East Oak Cliff (Seibel, 1976d, p. 1A).

However, on July 29, 1976, the Fifth Circuit Court denied the NAACP request, and on August 23, 1976, school opened under the new desegregation order. This order has been in effect in the Dallas schools since that time. However, the Fifth Circuit Court continued to exert influence on white and middle-class enrollment patterns. Uncertainty in the city remained when, on April 21, 1978, the appeals court remanded the 1976 desegregation plan to Judge Taylor's court. The appellate judges did not specifically strike down the existing desegregation plan, but they did order Judge Taylor to produce a plan that either justified or eliminated the approximately 68 one-ethnicity schools that remained in the DISD. In particular, the judges questioned the effectiveness of the magnet school concept for desegregating the District's high schools, and they asked for studies that would show why busing or other methods of desegregation could or could not be used to eliminate the one-ethnicity schools. Other points in their ruling were the ordering of Judge Taylor to formulate an adequate transportation plan for students opting for majority-to-minority transfers, and the upholding of Judge Taylor's decision not to include Highland Park in the DISD's desegregation plan. The record of the Highland Park schools was felt to confirm its contention of nondiscriminatory action.

One week after the appeals court ruling the school board voted to request a rehearing. In late May, 1978, the appeals court denied the rehearing request. Subsequently, the school board voted to request the United States Supreme Court to reverse the appeals court ruling. In addition, the board voted to seek a stay from the appeals court that would postpone any District court

hearings until the United States Supreme Court handed down its ruling. On January 21, 1980, the Supreme Court determined that it had no jurisdiction in the case. Thus, the District and citizens of Dallas are in the same situation as they were on April 21, 1978. The effects of the aforementioned chronology on attendance patterns is outlined in Figure 1. Support for the relationship between desegregation orders and "white flight" is found in the Webster-Mendro (1973) study where a marked correlation between such orders and white enrollment loss was demonstrated in a number of sampled cities. Although correlation does not necessarily imply causation, the relationship between desegregation orders and abrupt declines in white enrollment was too conspicuous to be attributed to chance. It is important to note that "white flight" is often indicative of middle-class flight and often correlates with the loss of middle- and upper-class minority families as well.

It seems clear from the statistics quoted above that it is in the best interests of the students and citizens of the DISD for the District to get out of court. There has been great uncertainty as to student assignment patterns since October 6, 1970, the date of the first suit addressing de facto segregation. The District has been in one court or another since that time. The net result has been a loss of 55,484 white students amounting to some 59 percent of the original population.

Student Achievement

The previous section of this paper outlined the relevant portions of the District's desegregation plan. A series of reports to the Court by the District's Department of Research and Evaluation document the District's efforts to implement the order (December and April 15, 1976, 1977, 1978,

1979). This section will examine one of the most important aspects of education, student achievement. Five subdistricts will be discussed. Each follows the procedures outlined in the court order. Their unique characteristics include:

Northwest Subdistrict - Approximately 3,000 students are bused for desegregation purposes at grades 4-6, and another 1,900 at grades 7-8.

Northeast Subdistrict - Approximately 2,600 students are bused for desegregation purposes at grades 4-6, and another 900 at grades 7-8.

Southeast Subdistrict - Approximately 2,500 students are bused for desegregation purposes at grades 4-6, and another 1,000 at grades 7-8. This also includes Seagoville.

East Oak Cliff Subdistrict - No busing for desegregation. Almost totally black.

Southwest Subdistrict - No busing for desegregation. A naturally integrated area.

The crucial question is, "has student achievement been affected by the 1976 court order?" In order to examine that question, District achievement test results were examined for 1973, 1976, 1979,1980, and 1981 (Meier and Eberhart 1979, Whitmore et al 1980, 1981). These points in time were chosen because:

Fall, 1973	Provides reliable baseline data for achievement levels prior to the 1976 Court Order. Helps place achievement levels in perspective.
Fall, 1976	Provides baseline data for achievement levels immediately before they were affected by the 1976 Court Order.
Spring, 1979 and Spring, 1980	Provides data after three and four years of the Court Order to allow better trend comparisons.
Spring, 1981	Provides the most recent achievement data.

The data reported in the next six tables (Tables 2 through 7) are based upon test scores of all students tested in each subdistrict and the entire

District for 1973, 1976, 1979, 1980, and 1981, for grades 2,4,6, and 8. Testing in 1973 and 1976 was in the Fall and hence prior to implementation of the 1976 Court Order, while testing in 1979, 1980, and 1981 was conducted in the Spring and hence after implementation of the Court Order. Form 5 of the Iowa Tests of Basic Skills (ITBS) was used in 1976, 1978, and 1979. In 1980, and 1981, Form 7 of the same test battery was used in grade 2, and Form 8 was used in grades 4-8. The changes in Forms 7 and 8 in 1980 required that student test records from earlier years be updated to conform to the 1978 norming of the new forms. For this purpose, the test publisher provided a table of scores on all subtests in grades 4-8. A local strategy was followed to convert old scores in grade 2; two independent methods (single-parameter latent trait modeling and equi-percentile scaling), corroborating each other's results, were used to convert old raw scores to new raw scores. Because of time constraints, score conversion efforts in grade 2 were limited to two tests: Reading and Mathematics. This explains the absence of summary statistics and discussion covering Language Arts in grade 2.

Tables 2 through 7 present system-wide achievement results in grades 2, 4, 6, and 8. The statistics reported are median large-city percentiles. The median percentiles for 1973 (equated from CAT and CTBS scores), 1976, and 1979 are based on 1972 ITBS norms. The median percentiles for 1979 (parentheses), 1980, and 1981 are based on 1978 norms. Thus trends can be detected by studying the data in spite of the fact that different forms of the Iowa Tests of Basic Skills (ITBS) normed in different years were used. If the equating had not been done, meaningful comparisons could not be made. Needless to say, the District could not continue to use tests normed in 1972.

Study of Tables 2 through 7 provides some interesting insights into District achievement trends, grades 2,4,6, and 8. First, and most important, the data

Table 2

Median Large-City Percentile Rankings* 1973-81

DISTRICTWIDE

Grade Level	Year	White			Black			Hispanic		
		R	L	M	R	L	M	R	L	M
	F73	69	65	58	27	17	21	32	22	32
	F76	72	56	55	26	24	30	33	24	35
Grade 2	S79	67(69)	64	60(77)	43(48)	49	37(52)	29(40)	35	37(52)
	S80	74	(70)	77	52	(59)	58	44	(44)	52
	S81	81	74	83	63	65	63	60	59	67
	F73	56	45	41	18	17	16	26	21	24
	F76	57	48	39	19	13	6	22	16	10
Grade 4	S79	63(75)	66(76)	57(74)	26(33)	31(41)	15(22)	26(36)	34(44)	22(30)
	S80	81	80	77	39	50	39	46	53	51
	S81	82	83	79	49	61	51	55	67	55
	F73	61	54	49	13	12	11	23	20	20
	F76	55	48	42	10	8	3	15	16	8
Grade 6	S79	51(75)	53(73)	49(70)	15(32)	19(31)	8(21)	20(34)	26(42)	18(35)
	S80	80	79	78	34	42	32	44	49	51
	S81	85	83	82	49	56	45	51	60	59
	F73	60	52	43	9	11	9	18	21	14
	F76	50	46	40	11	6	5	16	14	10
Grade 8	S79	51(82)	46(71)	44(72)	11(24)	10(21)	6(11)	17(33)	15(33)	12(26)
	S80	86	78	77	37	33	30	41	39	40
	S81	86	80	79	45	45	37	51	49	48

R = Reading L = Language M = Mathematics

*Grades 2,4,6,8 tested with ITBS, 1976-81
Grade 2 tested with CAT, 1973 (Scores equated)
Grades 4,6,8 tested with CTBS, 1973 (Scores equated)

Table 3

Median Large-City Percentile Rankings* 1973-81

NORTHWEST SUBDISTRICT

Grade Level	Year	White			Black			Hispanic		
		R	L	M	R	L	M	R	L	M
	F73	81	77	68	21	13	17	25	17	28
	F76	85	75	64	20	20	25	33	24	35
Grade 2	S79	74(77)	73	78(87)	34(40)	35	28(39)	34(40)	30	37(58)
	S80	83	(78)	85	44	(52)	52	40	(37)	52
	S81	84	82	89	60	62	67	60	62	71
	F73	70	59	56	15	14	14	20	19	24
	F76	70	66	58	16	10	6	22	13	10
Grade 4	S79	73(86)	76(84)	73(88)	20(27)	21(31)	15(22)	26(33)	31(41)	22(30)
	S80	88	87	88	30	34	34	46	55	51
	S81	91	91	89	43	53	47	55	65	59
	F73	75	67	61	11	10	11	20	19	18
	F76	72	68	62	6	5	3	15	18	12
Grade 6	S79	69(86)	72(85)	74(89)	12(20)	11(21)	8(21)	19(34)	26(44)	20(41)
	S80	91	87	90	30	36	29	44	52	51
	S81	91	89	88	42	42	38	56	58	62
	F73	71	66	58	9	10	8	16	18	13
	F76	64	60	56	10	5	5	15	11	10
Grade 8	S79	66(89)	63(84)	62(86)	8(17)	6(16)	4(10)	14(31)	12(25)	11(20)
	S80	89	86	86	27	27	28	37	35	37
	S81	91	90	91	37	35	37	51	47	47

R = Reading L = Language M = Mathematics

*Grades 2,4,6,8 tested with ITBS, 1976-81
Grade 2 tested with CAT, 1973 (Scores equated)
Grades 4,6,8 tested with CTBS, 1973 (Scores equated)

Table 4

Median Large-City Percentile Rankings* 1973-81

NORTHEAST SUBDISTRICT

Grade Level	Year	White			Black			Hispanic		
		R	L	M	R	L	M	R	L	M
	F73	74	67	61	23	13	18	33	24	35
	F76	79	64	55	26	24	30	26	24	35
Grade 2	S79	70(74)	72	64(77)	29(44)	35	37(52)	29(40)	35	37(46)
	S80	81	(74)	80	48	(52)	58	48	(44)	52
	S81	87	82	85	52	59	52	65	62	63
	F73	58	46	41	18	14	14	31	28	26
	F76	60	51	39	16	10	5	24	24	13
Grade 4	S79	68(81)	68(80)	57(77)	19(27)	18(31)	10(14)	26(33)	38(47)	22(30)
	S80	83	83	81	30	37	34	49	58	55
	S81	88	87	83	43	50	43	55	67	62
	F73	63	56	53	9	10	8	25	21	25
	F76	55	50	42	8	5	2	15	16	8
Grade 6	S79	53(75)	56(73)	49(70)	11(16)	11(19)	6(14)	26(44)	28(44)	29(51)
	S80	84	82	83	25	28	27	51	54	62
	S81	89	86	85	34	44	35	51	58	69
	F73	66	58	48	7	10	7	29	33	18
	F76	54	50	44	9	5	5	23	26	21
Grade 8	S79	54(83)	45(67)	46(74)	7(15)	4(9)	4(8)	22(43)	21(38)	17(30)
	S80	87	80	83	27	19	28	55	49	58
	S81	88	84	84	31	27	28	55	53	63

R = Reading L = Language M = Mathematics

*Grades 2,4,6,8 tested with ITBS, 1976-81
Grade 2 tested with CAT, 1973 (Scores equated)
Grades 4,6,8 tested with CTBS, 1973 (Scores equated)

Table 5

Median Large-City Percentile Rankings* 1973-81

SOUTHEAST SUBDISTRICT

Grade Level	Year	White			Black			Hispanic		
		R	L	M	R	L	M	R	L	M
Grade 2	F73	58	54	52	30	19	20	45	34	39
	F76	58	46	50	33	24	25	30	24	35
	S79	58(60)	56	51(71)	38(48)	44	28(46)	51(52)	56	37(58)
	S80	66	(65)	71	48	(52)	52	52	(55)	52
	S81	72	70	74	63	65	52	56	59	63
Grade 4	F73	43	36	35	18	19	18	26	23	22
	F76	39	32	31	19	16	6	18	16	10
	S79	55(69)	58(69)	47(65)	29(39)	38(50)	18(26)	31(43)	44(53)	28(39)
	S80	66	75	68	39	50	30	46	61	47
	S81	73	75	71	49	58	47	55	67	51
Grade 6	F73	47	40	37	11	10	11	20	20	21
	F76	39	32	25	12	10	4	17	16	10
	S79	41(62)	43(63)	35(59)	19(34)	21(39)	8(21)	26(44)	28(44)	20(41)
	S80	67	69	67	30	39	27	47	53	41
	S81	72	73	70	47	54	41	49	58	57
Grade 8	F73	45	38	31	8	9	8	25	24	18
	F76	30	28	23	9	5	4	18	17	12
	S79	36(70)	35(56)	28(53)	10(24)	8(19)	6(11)	20(42)	21(39)	15(30)
	S80	77	67	65	35	27	28	51	35	40
	S81	80	68	69	45	43	40	57	49	56

R = Reading L = Language M = Mathematics

*Grades 2,4,6,8 tested with ITBS, 1976-81
Grade 2 tested with CAT, 1973 (Scores equated)
Grades 4,6,8 tested with CTBS, 1973 (Scores equated)

Table 6

Median Large-City Percentile Rankings** 1973-81

EAST OAK CLIFF SUBDISTRICT

Grade Level	Year	White			Black			Hispanic		
		R	L	M	R	L	M	R	L	M
Grade 2	F73	*	*	*	32	22	24	*	*	*
	F76	*	*	*	26	24	25	*	*	*
	S79	*	*	*	48(48)	56	37(52)	*	*	*
	S80	*	*	*	52	59	58	*	*	*
	S81	*	*	*	62	62	63	*	*	*
Grade 4	F73	*	*	*	20	19	18	*	*	*
	F76	*	*	*	22	16	6	*	*	*
	S79	*	*	*	29(36)	34(44)	15(22)	*	*	*
	S80	*	*	*	43	53	39	*	*	*
	S81	*	*	*	49	61	51	*	*	*
Grade 6	F73	*	*	*	15	14	12	*	*	*
	F76	*	*	*	12	10	4	*	*	*
	S79	*	*	*	17(32)	21(39)	8(21)	*	*	*
	S80	*	*	*	39	44	35	*	*	*
	S81	*	*	*	49	56	41	*	*	*
Grade 8	F73	*	*	*	9	12	9	*	*	*
	F76	*	*	*	11	7	5	*	*	*
	S79	*	*	*	11(24)	10(23)	5(11)	*	*	*
	S80	*	*	*	37	35	26	*	*	*
	S81	*	*	*	47	47	35	*	*	*

R = Reading L = Language M = Mathematics

** Grades 2,4,6,8 tested with ITBS, 1976-81
Grade 2 tested with CAT, 1973 (Scores equated)
Grades 4,6,8 tested with CTBS, 1973 (Scores equated)

* N too small for results to be meaningful.

Table 7

Median Large-City Percentile Rankings* 1973-81

SOUTHWEST SUBDISTRICT

Grade Level	Year	White			Black			Hispanic		
		R	L	M	R	L	M	R	L	M
	F73	63	54	53	41	26	27	37	24	35
	F76	65	46	50	41	40	35	41	24	35
Grade 2	S79	61(66)	62	55(71)	51(52)	62	37(52)	29(35)	35	37(52)
	S80	69	(65)	74	66	(70)	63	52	(52)	58
	S81	74	65	80	72	74	71	56	59	67
	F73	50	38	35	23	17	18	28	23	24
	F76	48	45	35	22	13	10	22	20	10
Grade 4	S79	58(73)	62(73)	43(59)	34(43)	47(61)	22(34)	29(36)	38(47)	18(26)
	S80	75	76	68	52	61	51	49	53	47
	S81	77	80	74	58	73	62	55	67	55
	F73	54	49	44	18	18	13	25	24	23
	F76	48	40	29	15	12	6	15	16	8
Grade 6	S79	48(73)	51(69)	40(65)	22(42)	30(49)	16(35)	19(32)	24(39)	14(29)
	S80	77	71	70	51	58	45	39	47	45
	S81	84	82	81	67	71	65	56	62	57
	F73	54	45	35	18	18	14	18	20	15
	F76	39	37	30	12	9	7	15	12	10
Grade 8	S79	47(78)	38(64)	39(65)	21(41)	20(39)	15(30)	14(29)	15(31)	11(20)
	S80	82	73	71	55	51	45	35	39	33
	S81	86	76	74	61	58	51	51	47	45

R = Reading L = Language M = Mathematics

*Grades 2,4,6,8 tested with ITBS, 1976-81
Grade 2 tested with CAT, 1973 (Scores equated)
Grades 4,6,8 tested with CTBS, 1973 (Scores equated)

display a steady and significant upward trend in achievement levels in all basic skills areas. In addition, there appears to be a substantial increasing trend in the most recent comparisons (S79 through S81). It is important to note that these increases are apparent for all ethnic groups at all grade levels and, in many cases, represent achievement levels unprecedented in District history. It is also important to note that these achievement increases were accomplished in spite of significantly fewer middle-class children and significantly more poor children (at grade 2, for example, the percentage of children on free or reduced lunch for 1979-80 was 62.5, up from 37.6 in 1976-77). Finally, it should be noted that Black students from the East Oak Cliff Subdistrict generally scored as well or better than their peers in all other subdistricts except the Southwest Subdistrict.

When cohorts of students are tracked across years, similar patterns emerge. Dallas students generally keep pace with, or exceed, the growth patterns of students with whom they are compared. Considerable evidence exists to suggest that District students are reversing the trend known as the cumulative deficit.

Longitudinal or quasi-longitudinal comparisons at the upper-grade levels (grades 9-11) are not possible on standardized tests except for the last two years because the District changed from the Iowa Tests of Educational Development (ITED) to the Tests of Achievement and Proficiency (TAP) in 1980. These tests are not equatable. Table 8 displays the results of the TAP by ethnicity and subdistrict for grades 9, 10, and 11 for 1980 and 1981 (Whitmore, et al 1981). The mean gains made on the TAP 1980-81 are illustrated in Table 9. For each major ethnic grouping of each subdistrict, the table shows the mean percentile gain and the number of gains, losses, and ties

Table 8
Median Large-City Percentile Rankings,
TAP, 1980 & 1981

		White						Black						Hispanic					
	Grade	9		10		11		9		10		11		9		10		11	
Subdistrict	Subject	80	81	80	81	80	81	80	81	80	81	80	81	80	81	80	81	80	81
Northwest	R	80	82	79	82	72	76	26	26	17	22	18	20	39	33	35	41	37	37
	M	80	78	75	81	72	74	23	30	21	25	18	22	39	36	34	43	38	35
	W	79	79	80	85	74	79	27	31	20	27	15	19	35	39	30	41	33	33
	U	82	82	79	82	74	80	26	37	19	30	17	22	44	43	34	42	39	36
	SS	77	77	75	79	72	75	24	28	22	26	20	23	33	33	30	38	36	34
	S	74	74	74	78	72	73	26	30	24	27	19	23	33	33	31	38	30	34
Northeast	R	74	78	74	74	72	72	33	36	29	35	34	34	48	52	51	51	39	53
	M	75	78	72	72	70	72	27	36	29	34	30	30	47	60	52	55	35	46
	W	71	79	75	72	74	74	31	39	32	37	33	33	50	50	45	50	39	52
	U	76	79	72	74	71	74	38	45	37	40	32	34	57	57	51	52	41	47
	SS	70	78	72	74	70	71	38	41	38	34	34	34	47	54	50	50	39	51
	S	70	72	72	72	69	69	33	33	35	35	30	34	46	49	52	50	37	50
Southeast	R	58	55	53	56	53	53	24	26	23	21	20	20	39	42	38	35	34	39
	M	51	56	52	55	48	51	23	23	21	21	18	22	39	36	43	39	28	35
	W	48	46	45	45	43	43	27	27	24	24	19	21	31	31	32	41	29	33
	U	59	57	51	57	55	49	28	26	24	25	20	24	47	44	40	42	31	34
	SS	44	47	43	46	42	44	24	24	26	26	23	23	38	33	34	34	31	33
	S	43	46	47	50	43	43	26	26	24	27	23	23	37	35	31	38	34	36
EOC	R	*	*	*	*	*	*	24	24	19	21	18	20	*	*	*	*	*	*
	M	*	*	*	*	*	*	19	19	18	21	14	18	*	*	*	*	*	*
	W	*	*	*	*	*	*	24	24	24	24	16	21	*	*	*	*	*	*
	U	*	*	*	*	*	*	25	26	24	25	18	24	*	*	*	*	*	*
	SS	*	*	*	*	*	*	20	24	26	26	20	23	*	*	*	*	*	*
	S	*	*	*	*	*	*	26	24	24	27	23	23	*	*	*	*	*	*
Southwest	R	62	64	63	67	57	65	33	39	26	38	24	32	30	36	41	35	37	37
	M	56	60	55	62	55	59	27	36	25	34	26	26	27	27	34	39	35	35
	W	58	64	61	65	60	66	31	46	27	37	24	29	31	35	35	41	36	39
	U	64	66	61	69	60	67	41	44	35	42	27	27	35	41	40	40	38	39
	SS	57	60	57	60	56	64	33	41	34	28	27	31	28	28	38	38	36	39
	S	55	55	58	61	58	62	30	37	35	35	27	30	30	30	38	41	37	37

*N too small for results to be meaningful

R = Reading M = Mathematics W = Written Expression
U = Using Sources SS = Social Studies S = Science

for the 18 contrasts (6 subtests by 3 grades). For example, in the Northeast subdistrict, the Hispanic students scored an average of 5.72 more percentile points in 1981 than the similar group did in 1980. In that same contrast, there were 13 gains, 1 loss (10th grade social studies) and 4 ties (meaning no change from 1980 to 1981).

Table 9

Mean Percentile Gain on TAP, 1980-81

(G - Gain L = Loss T = Tie)

	WHITE	BLACK	HISPANIC	WITHIN SUBDISTRICT
NW-Mean Gain (G-L-T)	2.56 (13-1-4)	4.78 (17-0-1	2.72 (8-6-4)	3.35 (38-7-9)
NE-Mean Gain (G-L-T)	1.94 (11-1-6)	2.83 (11-1-6)	5.72 (13-1-4)	3.50 (35-3-16)
SE-Mean Gain (G-L-T)	1.22 (10-4-4)	.67 (6-2-10)	1.33 (10-6-2)	1.07 (16-12-16)
EOC-Mean Gain (G-L-T)	—	1.78 (11-1-6)	—	1.78 (11-1-6)
SW-Mean Gain (G-L-T)	4.61 (17-0-1)	5.56 (14-1-3)	1.72 (9-1-8)	3.96 (40-2-12)
Within Ethnicity-MG (G-L-T)	2.58 (51-6-15)	3.12 (59-5-26)	2.88 (40-14-18)	2.86 (150-25-59) Overall

Table 9 shows the solid gains Blacks made in almost every subtest at every grade level, particularly in the Southwest and Northwest Subdistricts where there were 31 gains, 1 loss, and 4 ties in the 36 contrasts. The mean percentile gains in these two subdistricts were 5.56 and 4.78 percentile points, respectively. Most of the large gains were at the 9th and 10th grade levels.

Whites also made consistant modest gains, except in the Southeast Subdistrict where there were 4 losses in 18 contrasts. The most notable improvement was in the Southwest Subdistrict where there were 17 gains and no losses, with an average gain of 4.61 percentile points.

Hispanics had mixed results, doing very well in the Northeast Subdistrict (mean gain 5.72), and in the 10th grade of the Northwest Subdistrict (mean gain 8.17), but less well in the Southeast Subdistrict (mean gain 1.33).

The Southwest Subdistrict had the greatest mean gain (3.96) with 40 gains, 2 losses and 12 ties, while the Southeast Subdistrict had the lowest mean gain (1.07) with 16 gains, 12 losses and 16 ties.

Overall, Blacks had the highest mean gain, Hispanics second highest and Whites the lowest mean gain. It is noteworthy that each ethnic group in each subdistrict had a positive gain when all subtests and grade levels were combined. Across grade level and ethnic grouping, the six subtests showed very similar improvement. The gain-loss-tie records for the subtests were:

Reading (24-5-10), Mathematics (26-5-8),
Written Expression (25-2-12), Using Sources (29-6-4),
Social Studies (24-4-11), and Science (22-3-14).

Within ethnic group and within grade level, the 9th grade Hispanic students (9-7-8) made considerably fewer gains than the other groups. Over all ethnic groups, the 11th graders showed the most improvement (53-4-21), 10th graders second best (54-8-16) and 9th graders (43-13-22) showed the least improvement. However, the generally widespread improvement reflects the concern and emphasis the District is placing on achievement in the basics.

In any program of comprehensive educational change, it is most efficient and lasting if change is engineered from the lower grades up. This is what appears to be happening in the DISD. Significant upward change has generally occurred through grade 8. There is also evidence to suggest that this change

has occurred in phases. The 1977-78 results showed the most substantial increases at grades 1 and 2, whereas the 1978-79 results showed similar increases at grades 3, 4, and 5, while the 1979-80 results extended those increases to grades 6, 7, and 8. The data displayed in Tables 8 and 9 suggest that significant changes are also occurring in grades 9-11. As shown in Table 10, results from the District's Basic Objectives Assessment Test (BOAT) also suggest modest educational gains in grades 9-11 (Whitmore, et al 1981).

Table 10

Percent of Enrolled Students
Who Passed the BOAT
At Some Administration

Grade	White			Black			Hispanic		
	79	80	81	79	80	81	79	80	81
8	68	70	77	24	29	40	30	33	41
9	80	83	89	32	39	53	46	53	65
10	89	93	95	46	53	67	61	73	83
11	94	97	98	53	67	74	71	82	92

Study of Tables 9 and 10 suggests that even in the upper grades, those grades most resistant to massive educational improvement because students often enter with serious educational deficits, improvement in achievement is occurring. Given the results displayed in Tables 2 through 10, and being cognizant of the trends that are in progress, it is reasonable to expect student achievement in the upper grades to continue its upward progress during the next few years.

It is important to note that the results reported here were not precipitated by a narrow desegregation order. The court order, in fact, provided for many more provisions than the movement of students. The District has launched numerous curriculum efforts aimed at strengthening educational programs for

all children. In fact, Sheehan and Marcus (1978) presented evidence to suggest that black students in segregated schools achieved better than black students in desegregated schools. This evidence was supported by the District-wide results which have been previously noted. They were also unable to find evidence to support the supposition that transported students achieved differently than nontransported students in a desegregated school environment.

Summary

The information outlined in this paper warrants several generalizations:

1. There does not exist in the desegregation literature any reliable evidence pertaining to the success or failure of desegregation programs in general, and busing in particular, in effecting the achievement of either majority or minority students.

2. There does not exist in the desegregation literature any reliable evidence pertaining to the success of desegregation programs in promoting societal integration. On the contrary, desegregation implementation appears to be related to resegregation.

3. The DISD's white enrollment has declined by some 55,484 students since 1970. This leaves the District without a critical mass of white students to desegregate. Loss of those students is highly correlated with attempts to remedy de facto segregation.

4. Since the implementation of the court order of 1976, black and hispanic student achievement in the DISD is at an all-time high. It has generally equalled or exceeded the growth patterns of black and hispanic students across the country. This has occurred despite the continued loss of black and hispanic middle-class students.

5. Since the implementation of the court order of 1976, white student achievement is steady to up. This has occurred despite the continued loss of white middle-class students.

6. Since the implementation of the court order of 1976, minority achievement in the predominantly black East Oak Cliff Subdistrict is up as much or more than minority achievement in the rest of the District. The only Subdistrict that has consistently shown greater achievement gains among minority students is the Southwest, an area where no busing for desegregation occurs.

7. Since the implementation of the court order of 1976, Hispanic student achievement is up.

Dallas is now a school district at the crossroads. Significant improvements have been made in the delivery of instruction to all students. Student achievement is showing continual improvement. The East Oak Cliff Subdistrict, as well as the remainder of the District, have implemented many innovative and exciting educational programs. Is this trend toward better education of young people in a multicultural environment to continue, or is Dallas once more going to have to change its educational delivery system and suffer a possible setback in educating its children? The data are clear. Education in Dallas works better now, in 1981, than it ever has. Though it has a long way to go before reaching what educators and citizens alike want in an educational system, it needs a chance to continue current trends so that it can reach its goal of educating all children of all people.

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